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Hosni

March 17th, 2010 | Posted by Aosher in General | Politics | Politics - Middle East - (0 Comments)

Hosni Mubarak sits in a high-backed chair in front of the Egyptian flag.

Apologies if this post is somewhat short of being lucid – I’ve not been sleeping well lately and am thus struggling with articulation.

Hosni Mubarak, President-for-life of Egypt, re-emerged overnight after a protracted stay in a German hospital, quelling rumours of comas, juntas, illegitimate children and unannounced deaths, although the internet of course persists in contriving elaborate conspiracy theories. For a moment, though, it did look touch-and-go; and sources continue to report that Mubarak won’t seek another term in office following this recent health scare.

Which is doubtless what prompted Stratfor to hold forth on what course a post-Mubarak Egypt might take. Like the good folk at arabist.net, I’m not convinced by the idea that current intelligence chief General Suleiman will place-hold for young Jamal Mubarak; although I have no doubt that there are sections of the Egyptian government who believe that that is, or are counting it being, the plan, but the factionalism that exists within the Egyptian government and the ruling NDP is such that any multi-stage transition of this kind seems unlikely. If General Suleiman were to take power then I’d consider it far more likely that he will keep power, rather than handing it off to a comparative neophite with no firm powerbase of his own.

Questions about who will run Egypt tomorrow, however, should not distract from the question of who is running Egypt today:

This is new. For all its faults, Egypt’s political system generally makes clear who is in charge [...] Is it the security apparatus? His son? High members of the National Democratic Party? What is the role of his wife, a visible figure in Egyptian public life? Most important of all, who will follow him? Mubarak’s illness has catapulted these questions from the rumor mill to the headlines. But it has not answered them.

Aside from its overenthusiastic punctuation, the al-Shuruq article calmly reported that Husni Mubarak had deputized Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif to take on day-to-day presidential responsibilities. But Nazif is no Alexander Haig asserting that he is in control. If there is an Egyptian Haig, he is not in sight. The article made clear that Nazif’s authority is limited and that in important matters (such as those related to security) he consults with named and unnamed responsible authorities. [...]

While it is not clear who wields power — or who will run things if Mubarak’s absence becomes permanent — it is clearer how that power is being wielded. There are, to be sure, some signs of disarray, of different institutions and power centers pulling in different directions. But that disarray only goes so far. The overall direction is clear: Egypt is now in the midst of an uneven political clampdown.

Pity Egypt.

From porn to politics

March 15th, 2010 | Posted by Aosher in Feminism | General | Politics | Politics - UK - (0 Comments)

Last week, Anna Arrowsmith (aka Anna Span) declared her intent to become the Lib Dem MP for Gravesham. Interesting in and of itself because she was Britain’s first female, and self-avowed feminist, pornographer – here’s the article for the Guardian in which she elaborated on her candidacy. She stands an very remote chance of winning – the seat’s a CON-LAB marginal, having gone Blue in 2005 with less than 700 votes to spare, and one in which the Dems have always come a distant third, but she’s had a lot of press since announcing last Thursday, and with a few thought-out media appearances and some considered policy talk, such a situation can ignite a candidacy.

Of course, badly thought-out appearances and ill-considered policy talk can go straight through ignition and all the way to immolation, but that’s the gamble. The Dems are casting the bones on the possibility that, off the back of the current Party Conference and the televised debates, they’re going to get some momentum going – and those indecisive Con-Lab marginals might just start thinking about third parties, especially those in the media glare.

Her candidacy has had exactly the reaction that you’d expect – Ann Widdecombe thinks that having a pornographer run for parliament is “inappropriate,” while leftie bloggers, like Hopi Sen, reject the fuss as middle-England’s usual strident puritanism, and in the meanwhile columnists in all sections of the media have fallen over themselves chortling at their own clever double entendres and witty conflations of politics and the sex trade.

All well and good, but personally, I’m not convinced that this is a question that really requires a moral dimension – I’m just interested in whether she’d make a good enough politican to be worth voting for. Initial signs aren’t promising; the Guardian article linked to above is, in fairness, a bit of a rambling, narcissistic mess. She claims that she can fix the Westminster boy’s club, on the grounds that she’s “been here before; last time [she] changed [her] industry for ever;” I must respectfully disagree. Anna Arrowsmith may have entered the pornography arena with the best of intentions, but it is no less grubby, fundamentally unrealistic and driven by underlying mysogyny than it ever was – if anything, it’s getting worse. One must question the judgement of anyone who thinks that a single person could fundementally change the nature of pornography from within.

On the other hand, it’s probably fairly safe to assume that she doesn’t have any skeletons in her closet. And she’d probably be a rather more worthwhile MP than the incumbent.

Vice President Joe Biden is not a happy man.

He went all the way to Israel to calm some tattered nerves, to salve some egos, to smooth some furrowed brows with talk of unshakable bonds and “happy ends” (don’t ask) – not to mention with an intent to kick-start a new round of “proximity talks” between Israel and the PLO.

And how was he greeted?

Well, I’m glad you asked! On the day that he arrived, Israel approved 1600 new housing units in the Ramat Shlomo neighborhood of Jerusalem. Ramat Shlomo is itself a fairly new neighborhood in north Jerusalem that lies just west of the Arab neighborhoods of Shu‘afat and Beit Hanina, not far from the Shu‘afat refugee camp. What’s more, Harat Shlomo is an ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) neighborhood. It’s east of the Green Line, of course – meaning that it’s well into what the international community would consider to be Palestinian territory – and not far from the East Jerusalem to Ramallah road.

Whatever the future of Jerusalem ends up being, though, this really looks like a deliberate affront to Biden. Netanyahu has disavowed all knowledge, and the stroy goes that Interior Minister Eli Yishai, who heads the hard-line Shas Party, was freelancing. This seems implausible, to say the least; Netanyahu’s hold on his coalition is not so shaky as to allow such an obvious and major insult to sneak through without clearance. It’s too overt; it’s as if someone in the Prime Minister’s office said to themselves, “Where could we approve new construction that would be the most offensive to the US right now?” Yes, Israel insists it has the right to build in all parts of Jerusalem, but the timing here looks like a blatant “in your eye, Joe” to the Vice President, and it sounds like he took it that way:

“I condemn the decision by the government of Israel to advance planning for new housing units in East Jerusalem. The substance and timing of the announcement, particularly with the launching of proximity talks, is precisely the kind of step that undermines the trust we need right now and runs counter to the constructive discussions that I’ve had here in Israel. We must build an atmosphere to support negotiations, not complicate them. This announcement underscores the need to get negotiations under way that can resolve all the outstanding issues of the conflict. The United States recognizes that Jerusalem is a deeply important issue for Israelis and Palestinians and for Jews, Muslims and Christians. We believe that through good faith negotiations, the parties can mutually agree on an outcome that realizes the aspirations of both parties for Jerusalem and safeguards its status for people around the world. Unilateral action taken by either party cannot prejudge the outcome of negotiations on permanent status issues. As George Mitchell said in announcing the proximity talks, “we encourage the parties and all concerned to refrain from any statements or actions which may inflame tensions or prejudice the outcome of these talks.”

Pat Lang said it best:

Joe! Joe! If you kiss their butts and say that they are we and we are they, then you have to expect to be treated like the servant that you are. Just today you snuggled up to them and told the world that there is no “space between Israel and the US.” They took you at your word, that’s all. You got what you asked for.

The real question is: how far can Israel push before the US public allows its government to push back?

Here’s the thing with the BBC, right. They can post an article like this entirely uncritically. This is the problem with attempting to maintain an unbiased reportage – it makes you scared of making the obvious responses, such as: “If you want an uncomplicated intelligence-sharing relationship, stop fucking torturing people. We don’t let Libya do it so why should you?”

Also, wtf White House. I thought that the Republicans were the torture-apologist party in the US?

Intelligence derived through torture is illegal under international law. Not Iraq-war illegal; actually illegal, in that most civilised countries have extremely tight laws in place to prevent its admission. I, for one, am pleased that our courts have overturned the decision of that gutless, venal slime of a Foreign Secretary and have staked their colours to the wall on this.

Edit to add: Liberal Conspiracy identifies Britain’s worst journalist on the basis of this. Come back BBC, all is forgiven. Ish.

Nick Robinson’s analysis of why the Snow Plot failed misses, I think, one key reason why none of Mr. Brown’s antagonists have succeeded.

That being: there there are actually no, or at least very few, actual policy or ideology wedge issues that split the Labour Party. Even at Cabinet level, the tension is not related to any specific direction of travel or intellectual underpinning that Gordon Brown has embraced. The rift is purely stylistic, which makes it something of a curiosity, as both Thatcher and Major faced intra-party opposition who disagreed with them profoundly on the way in which the country should be run. But more than that, it’s this quality that severely reduces the dissent’s chances of success: without the white heat of an ideological rift, getting enough people to take on a sufficient amount of risk to oust a sitting Prime Minister would be an impossible task.

An argument could be constructed that the lack of a coherent alternative ideology within Labour is a symptom of Labour’s political turpitude, and to be sure, the cabinet does seem to lack the ideological creativity that one would expect of a government at war with itself. With the exception of Harriet Harman and Ed Balls in their respective remits, they seem to be a bunch singularly averse to asserting firm positions on anything.

The thing left unsaid

January 7th, 2010 | Posted by Aosher in General | Politics | Politics - UK - (0 Comments)

One very simple thing about the Snow Plot that has become very clear, but yet which is not getting any traction in any of the analysis I’ve seen about it, is this:

The reason why this story has so much potency is because if a secret ballot were to be held, Gordon Brown would almost certainly lose.

If you think about that, it’s quite remarkable.

It’s the open secret that hangs over British politics like a thundercloud; one of the major parties is going into an election led by a person that the majority of its members don’t want to be Prime Minister. And what’s even more remarkable is that this has been clear for a long time, and that, despite numerous attempts, no-one has succeeded in prising him out.

Fact-checking Yemen

January 6th, 2010 | Posted by Aosher in General | Politics | Politics - Middle East - (0 Comments)

Yemen has leapt into the media spotlight since Christmas Day, and probably for good reason – like Somalia, it’s a perennially misunderstood and under-observed place, whose sudden elevation in the eye of the global media has led to some wild and hysterical mis-reportage. Waq Waq, which has been fighting the good fight on Yemeni news for nearly a year, shares my despondence. The misunderstanding of the nature of qat is a particular pet peeve; yes, it’s mildly narcotic, and yes it informs myriad attending problems, such as water consumption, reduced productivity in the workforce and the criminality inspired by the mafia-esque organisations that distribute it. But it has next to nothing to do with terrorism, alienation or extremism in the region, so why every news report feels the need to hold it up as a cultural constant is beyond me.

An inside look on one at the least-understood of geopolitic’s actors is always worth a look. Understanding the structure of power in Tehran is crucial as it provides context for everything that is happening today, and this is a clear, lucid and accessible starting point.

Haters gonna hate

January 6th, 2010 | Posted by Aosher in General | Politics | Politics - UK - (0 Comments)

The plot threw off the actual post I was going to make today, which was along the lines of: aren’t things going well for Nick Clegg all of a sudden?

I’m not the only one who thinks so, although the attention Clegg gets from the Left and the Super-Left may not be entirely indicative. But Clegg has been experiencing a bit of a resurgence, one which probably began with the news that he would be sharing an equal stage with the other leaders in the televised debate. It was a great coup for him, and it now seems clear that it was waved through by the other leaders as part of their collective woo’ing of the third party. It’s unusual for a third party leader to be so courted, but the real takeaway from this is the left-wing media reaction. If Labour can’t provide a meaningful alternative to the Tories, could we see media outlets switching to the Lib Dems?

Of course, all of this got subsumed by the plot, a bit. For a while it looked like it might have traction but at this stage it seems to have fizzled. This probably isn’t very good for the Lib Dems, who need Labour to retain some kind of competitive margin in order to have any hung-parliament value, and it certainly isn’t very good for Labour either. So we’ll just have to see what the next few days bring. It may well be, of course, that for all the high drama voters have already factored Labour’s fractiousness into their voting intentions, and all of this will have next to no effect whatsoever…

More detail on the Jordanian who killed seven CIA operatives here. It’s a pretty remarkable story, really – in some ways one is inclined to believe that technology has moved us past the point at which physical, flesh-and-blood cloak ‘n’ dagger intrigue is efficient or cost-effective. But then, one would not be alone:-

In the past, Jordanian officials have privately criticized American intelligence services, saying they relied too heavily on technology and not enough on agents capable of infiltrating operations.

Ironic. But also interesting given my post yesterday. The man had been plucked from a Jordanian jail and recruited by the Americans and the Jordanians to spy on Al Qaida. He had a history of supporting violent islamist causes, and was a well-known contributor to al-Hesbah, a online forum run by Islamist extremists. He also ran his own Islamist blog. That the US military allowed him to walk straight from an Al Qaida stronghold into a US military intelligence facility without even frisking him shows a severe and naive lack of understanding of basic human nature.

What does a good week look like when talking about Iran?

Sadly, the last few weeks have skirted about as close to positive as we are likely to see, at least in the short term.

First, a bad story miraculously managed not to get worse. On the back of the collapse of a near-miss deal, which would have allowed for Iranian fuel to be enriched in French and Russian reactors, and the revelations of a second reactor in Qom, the US House of Representatives passed a crummy bill (when AIPAC crow about it, you know it’s bad), giving the President the power to ban any company who traded in Iranian petroleum from operating in the US – effectively, a sanction. This would be – and still may, in actuality, end up being – an awful idea; Prof. Gary Sick referred to it as “perhaps the worst idea to come out of Congress since they opposed the purchase of Alaska”, although Sarah Palin reminds us of the charms of that earlier act of obstructionism. Indeed, the sanctions would be entirely self-defeating; they would, by forcing legitimate companies to avoid trading in Iranian fuel, channel funds and effective power into the hands of the Revolutionary Guards, while further agitating the possibility another neocon pet war in the Middle East and exacerbating the perception that the US is hostile to the average Iranian. But midterms loom, it looks great on a campaign leaflet, and opposing it is politically risky, especially with the Democratic brand so heavily tarnished by the dirty fight over healthcare.

Happily, the US media – probably heavily aided by the White House – have responded responsibly, acknowledging the substantial successes that the White House has enjoyed in its current policy and hopefully giving the Senate the cover it needs to quietly neuter the sanctions bill.

Secondly, contrary to the expectations of many – including myself – the Green rebellion continues to develop, almost in spite of the conventional wisdom surrounding how rebellions and revolutions behave. Once again, Gary Sick, who predicted that the dissent would have legs, provides some measure of clarity on this. In many respects, the Iranian regime has performed a by-the-book suppression of the unrest, but have met with little success.

One of the interesting factors surrounding the post-election Iranian unrest is the extent to which it has been beyond the influence of individuals. At the time of the election, I said the following:

I think that Ahmedinejad is, at best, a bystander in events at the moment. To an extent, though, so is Mousavi; he seems to be one step behind the protests, always calling them after they’ve already been arranged. And to a different extent, so too is Khamenei. The ultimate choice of whether to risk it all by using force is his and his alone, but that’s the limit of his ability to act; I don’t think he’ll take that choice, so it remains to be seen how far the protesters can go.

As time goes by, this seems truer and truer. Even following the assassination of his nephew, there is no indication to suggest that Mousavi is even particularly closely connected to the bulk of the revolutionary force, which seems to be quite adept at organising and directing itself. Ahmedinejad, after a brief attempt at a post-election power-grab, has disappeared completely as an actor on both the national and international stages. And Khamenei… I wonder to what extent the Revolutionary Guard are still loyal to him, given that his survival increasingly rests squarely on their shoulders. If this rebellion does develop into a full-blown revolt then it will be a unique and intriguing new form of civil unrest, albeit one that may be applicable only to the uniquely Byzantine circumstances that prevail in Iran.

I have long admired Prof. Sick’s analysis on Iran but have respectfully dissented against his optimism regarding the outcome of the current turmoil. It increasingly seems, however, that a positive outcome in Iran may be possible – not likely, perhaps, and certainly not imminent, but possible. The longer that the Green revolutionaries in Iran hold out, and the wise continue to thread the needle in Washington, the better the odds get.

Food and trade

March 10th, 2009 | Posted by Aosher in General | History | Politics | Thorough Wonkiness - (0 Comments)

In the mid fifteenth century, the Venetians were the undisputed masters of the Mediterranean. Following the sacking of Genoa, they had no meaningful rivals when it came to the sea’s lucrative trade routes, and the Ottoman overthrow of Byzantium and the destruction of Armenia meant that overland trade with Asia Minor was all but impossible. Operating mainly through Beirut and Alexandria, Venetian ships more or less single-handedly represented Europe’s market to the old world.

In these two ports, everything was traded – the goods brought overland from India and China along the Silk Road – Persian gums, precious stones – copper and incense from the south of the Arabian peninsula, ivory, pearls, fruit and cloth from north Africa. But one commodity stood above the rest, commanding prices put all of the others to shame, and that was spice – more specifically, pepper.

What the spice trade meant to Europe can be read upon the pages of any medieval account or cookery book. In spite of the perverse vagaries of the Mameluke Sultans – whose greed could send prices soaring on a whim, and whose uncertain tempers and squalls of fury could inflict upon a patrician Venetian a flogging, as if he were a slave – to the Republic, the rewards were well worth the costs. German, French and English consumers would pay whatever prices were demanded for as much spice as Venice could supply.

But, in 1487, Batholomew Diaz became the first European to sail around the Cape of Good Hope, and before the end of the century Vasco de Gama proved the viability of a sea route to Calicut. This was apocalyptic for the Venetians; a pilgrim’s journal of the time notes that “all the city of Venice was greatly impressed and alarmed, and the wisest men held that this was the worst news that could ever come to the city.” Sure enough, by 1502, the Venetians found that there was no spice to be found in Alexandria. The Portuguese had stolen the trade, although the English would later steal it from them in turn, and Venice’s star was on the wane.

I find this interesting for several reasons. Firstly, I think that cooking – the desire to source new, exciting ingredients and have them delivered fresh – is underrated as a motivator when it comes to understanding geopolitics. It only recently that, for the first time in human history, the most commonly internationally traded resource had not been a foodstuff; coffee, the erstwhile leader, still accounts for phenomenal quantities of shipping every year. To those who say that the current banking crisis somehow proves the inviability of capitalism as model, that this is the end of the supremacy of the market, I can only say: human behaviour is economic behaviour. As long as people need to eat, international trade will be at the forefront of or politics, our society, and our world. A few fewer banks and a few fewer bankers won’t change that; there still will be banks and traders and investors, because at the end of the day, people will always need pepper, and that’s the bedrock upon which international trade is built, not mortgages. The mortgage trade may seem like a lot when your fate is directly linked to interest rates, but it’s peanuts compared to how the peanut sellers roll.

Secondly, it illustrates what a harsh mistress that very market is. Both Venice and Portugal had their dreams of glory dashed on the spice trade; then, as now, the Middle East proved to be an unreliable trading ground. In the context of this history, it makes sense for America to pursue their ethanol dream. What doesn’t make sense, however, is why the rest of the world is allowing them to do so. If the Brazilians have developed, in sugar cane ethanol, a fuel that is four times more efficient than America’s corn ethanol at the same cost, a fuel which many believe has the potential to be as efficient as gasoline, and a fuel which impacts global food supplies in no way at all, then why isn’t China, or Russia, or the EU, investing in it?

The food crisis

November 11th, 2008 | Posted by Aosher in General | Politics | Thorough Wonkiness - (3 Comments)

It is reasonably clear that the world is in the grip of a prolonged and aggressive food crisis. Since 2005, there have already been food riots in more than 30 different countries. Paul Collier, a Professor of Economics at Oxford, claims that the price of food has jumped by 83% in that time – a price rise that the rich world has largely absorbed, but which has had horrific ramifications on the inhabitants of less developed nations.

 

While this is a severe problem, it is in fact less complex than many problems of similar scale; however, it is beset by misunderstanding. Effective solutions to world hunger exist, but they are impeded by a mixture of ignorance, romanticism, populism and cynicism. Tackling the issue requires a candid look at the effects of food prices, and an understanding of the mechanisms that can be used to control them.

 

Firstly, it is necessary to look beyond root causes. There is a general ignorance surrounding the question of how food prices have risen so high, so quickly, but the answer is actually relatively straightforward. This drive in food prices was caused by the rapid pace of economic develolment in Asia, which houses over half of the worlds population. Although still poor (the average resident of Asia devotes over half of their budget to food), this population is rapidly getting richer, and thus their demand for food is increasing. Not only that, but it is becoming more intensive; grain-based carbohydrate diets are being upgraded to protein-rich habits, and as it takes six kilograms of grain to produce one kilogram of beef, this is having a significant effect on demand. The solution to the problem of food prices can thus be effectively uncoupled from its cause; short of making Asia poor and malnutriated again, food prices cannot be controlled by reversing the stimulus that caused them to rise. 

Secondly, we need to look at who actually suffers the most from high food prices. Causes such as Fair Trade and Red have become popular in the rich world over the last decade, mostly as a result of the famines that struck Africa in the later part of the twentieth century and thus off of the back of movements such as LiveAid. However, they operate on an underlying assumption that is broadly incorrect: the Africans in agrarian communities are the real losers of the world food lottery. Admittedly, African farmers tend to do rather less well out of high food prices than their Western counterparts, mostly because the markets that they serve are unresponsive to global food prices. However, farmers do have two rather large advantages when it comes to surviving food crises. Firstly, they are growing their own crops. Regardless of what happens to the food market, they can always ensure that they themselves have something to eat. And secondly, they have the World Food Program, a buyer of last resort in famine years who can prevent a failed crop from being a catastrophe. Now, the World Food Program is not a prefect institution. Its budget is set in dollars, not bushels, so it is less capable of responding when food prices are high (as they are now) – ironically making it much less effective during times of global food shortage. Farmers are still vulnerable to famine, drought, and crop failure. But they are still comparatively well off; provided that they manage to eke out a crop, the current food market actually works in their favour.

 

Comparatively well off, that is, to the urban poor, who are the real losers when it comes to high global food prices. In the cities of the developing world (typically ports), the slum-dwellers and underpriviliged must spend on food a proportion of their income five times greater than that of their wealthier neighbours. Because they have no recorse to their own subsistence farming, they are accutely vulnerable to price shocks. Ironically, it is these urban workers who have the greatest economic impact; keeping them fed will have a far greater impact on the relative wealth of nations than proping even agrarian sectors. This is the problem that I’ve always had with Fair Trade; it seems to me to be a vehicle for exporting western agrarian romanticism, when what the developing world needs is a more pragmatic look at what is required, and accordingly targetted stimulus to make the most difference. 

 

Sadly, the victim’s victim in this case is the children, who are by far the most likely to go hungry. If a child remains malnourished for more than two years, the concequence is almost always stunted growth – an uncurable lifetime of physical and mental disability, and potentially a genetic factor for the next generation. The food market has been tight for three years already; a short-term solution is clearly needed.

 

Solutions are possible – no, it would be better to say that solutions are already potentially present. The world already produces more food than it requires. Supply needs to be boosted, as the population will keep growing, but the economic mechanisms that control the matching of supply and demand for food need to be reformed. The impediments are threefold: public romanticism, political populism and economic cynicism.

 

I’ve already touched on western agrarian romanticism, but to make my point more explicit here: the West needs to end its love affair with farmers, both its own and those in the third world. The “buy locally” movement in Europe and America is commendable, but Britain, America, France and countries like it all produce radically more food than it could ever consume, largely thanks to government subsidies and farmers union pressure on quotas, each of which have broad appeal amongst the population at large. This, however, is special treatment, and it is distortative. If these policies were being put in place for houses instead of grain, then the outcome would be ruinous. Subsidising grain is more acceptable than subsidising houses, for two reasons; firstly, because of the rural idyll; and secondly, because subsidised surplus grain can always be dumped – unsubsidised surplus grain, of course, would have to be sold, overseas if need be, thus easing the pressure on global prices. Farming in the west is not a competitive business; it is not exposed to normal market forces. It needs to be; small farmers are inefficient, while larger organisations, with better investment and more robust defenses against the vagiaries of the market, will help to lower prices at home and thus around the world. There will always be demand for local produce, free-range chickens and organic vegetables; and thus, there will almost certainly always be supply. However, small-scale farming in the rich world is an increasingly harmful anachronism. 

 

Public fetishisation of farmers leads to political populism – always a baleful influence but especially malign in the farming sector. From corn subsidies for ethanol in the US to the Common Agricultural Policy in Europe, governments throughout the rich world are responsible for some deeply flawed policy-making in the name of fuelling agrarian romanticism. Worse than that is the pandering that is offered to those afraid of agricultural science. Some 300m acres of the world’s crop area, a full 10%, house genetically modified crops. There is still no evidence of any kind to suggest that it may have any negative effects at all, a decade after the science was globally introduced. But still, almost none of that land is in Europe or Africa. Needless to say, this has had a profound effect on supply, in the continent that would benefit from increased supply the most. 

 

Economic cynicism is fuelled by those bodies that benefit the most from the status quo – governments that put export caps on domestic grain, for example, forcing crops to be dumped in order to keep international prices high, or lobbying groups that keep markets restricted and subsidies in place. It is this behaviour that has led to Brazilian sugar ethanol – far more efficient than corn ethanol and significantly cheaper, and greener, to produce – being restricted for import into the US. This, however, is not an area that is likely to change. Economic cynicism will always exist and is essentially uncombatable. It can, however, be worked around.

 

Paul Collier suggests three immediate policy changes that would reverse the trend in food prices quickly: expand large commercial farms, end the ban on GM crops and do away with US subsidies on ethanol. The end of ethanol subsidy would hopefully sharply reduce the rate at which crop prices rise, due to the influx of American corn that would be swiftly re-inserted into the global market. The expansion of farms and the wider imposition of GM crops would increase production over the course of the next decade to ensure that prices stay controllable. I would add three more: ending the CAP in Europe and liberalising trade agreements between Europe and Africa, allowing more food to come into Africa from outside but not so artificially priced that it destroys the local markets, and reforming the World Food Program, allowing it to buy and sell food with greater and more targetted efficiency.

 

Politically, all of these propositions are difficult, especially in these times of economic crisis; old industries, such as farming and manufacture, gain significant lustre when banks and house-prices start to take a tumble. However, the arguments for all of them are rational and sound, while the arguments against them tend to be emotional and easily countered. I await a politican with the principle to do the necessary – John McCain looked useful on ethanol subsidies, but I severely doubt that Barack Obama will step to the plate. If the mark of a good politician is the ability to guide citizens away from populism, then I hope that a good politican emerges soon, because there are a few romantic illusions that urgently need shattering.